Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences by Kıbrıs, Özgür et al.
Allocating Multiple Estates among Agents with
Single-Peaked Preferences∗
Anirban Kar†
Özgür Kıbrıs‡
July 1, 2006
Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating multiple social endowments (estates) of a
perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences
when each agent’s share can come from at most one estate. We assume that an agent
only cares about the size of her share and not the identity of the estate from which
it comes. We inquire if well-known single-estate rules, such as the Uniform rule, the
Proportional rule or the fixed-path rules can be coupled with a matching rule so as
to achieve efficiency in the multi-estate level. We first observe that on the class of
problems where all agents have symmetric preferences, any efficient single-estate rule
can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. We however obtain negative results
on the full preference domain.
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1 Introduction
The problem of sharing a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible commodity has received a
great deal of attention in the recent literature on mechanism design. This issue arises when
members of a joint venture have to share costs or surpluses associated with the venture or
when a scarce resource has to be allocated among competing users (for example, fishing
rights in the North sea among European Union members or SO2 emission permits among
coal burning power plants).1
In an influential paper, Sprumont (1991) analyzes this problem under a single-peaked pref-
erences assumption. He proposes a uniform rationing rule (henceforth, the Uniform rule):
when there is excess demand, the Uniform rule gives each agent the smaller of a common
amount and the agent’s most preferred consumption. Conversely, each agent receives the
larger of these two amounts in case of excess supply.
On Sprumont’s (1991) framework, many desirable properties are jointly compatible. To
name a few, the Uniform rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness, anonymity, no-
envy, equal division lower bound, peak-only, continuity, consistency, converse consistency,
resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, and welfare domination under preference
replacement (see Thomson (1996) for definitions and discussion of these properties).2 Based
on these observations, several characterizations of the Uniform rule are presented (e.g. see
Sprumont (1991), Ching (1992, 1994), and Thomson (1994a, 1994b)).
The literature also shows that very large classes of rules satisfy Pareto efficiency and
strategy proofness. Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) identify the class of allocation rules
that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness, and a monotonicity property. Moulin (1999)
1See Kıbrıs (2003) for an axiomatic analysis of the problem of allocating freely disposable emission
permits among firms each equipped with a single-peaked “profit function” and an exogenous constraint on
its emissions.
2There are two alternative formulations of the last three properties. The first [second] type of formulation
requires all agents’ welfare [shares] be similarly affected by a change in the problems parameters. The Uniform
rule satisfies the second type of formulations as well as weaker forms of the first type.
2
and Ehlers (2002) show that Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness, resource monotonicity and
consistency characterize a large class of fixed-path rules. This class includes both symmetric
methods, such as the Uniform rule, and asymmetric methods like priority rules.
This abundance of positive results looks promising about the existence of “good” solutions
to the following extension of this problem: there are multiple estates (each containing a social
endowment of the commodity in question), the agents are first to be assigned to these estates
and then the endowment of each estate is to be allocated among the agents assigned to it.
An agent can be assigned to only one estate.3 We analyze this problem under the assumption
that the agents only care about their consumption of the commodity and not the estate they
are assigned to.
This problem seems to be a good abstraction of several real-life problems where a social
endowment exists in several physically disjoint estates or where the agents have to be served
in multiple isolated markets.4 Consider, for instance, a manager that has to assign workers
to projects and in each project has to allocate the workload (e.g., the ministry of education
hiring teachers for public schools, or a department head in a consulting company forming
project teams). If the projects are at distant locations or if they require developing specialized
knowledge, it is natural to require each worker to be assigned to only one project. Note
that a worker with strictly convex preferences on money-leisure bundles has single-peaked
preferences on the boundary of his budget set, and thus on his workload.5
3Without a constraint on the assignments, feasible allocations for our extended problem is no different
than those for a single-estate problem which has a social endowment that is equal in amount to the sum of
the existing estates’ endowments.
4Indeed, rationing methods for markets in disequilibrium have been central in the construction of micro-
economic foundations to Keynesian theories. Benassy (1982) presents a detailed discussion. He also discusses
some problems that can arise when there are multiple isolated markets (e.g. see page 22).
5As another example, consider a university administration that has to allocate the capacity of two servers
among departments. If there is a proportionally shared fixed cost of maintaining the servers, departmental
preferences will typically be single-peaked because more time on the server increases the department’s cost.
Typically, each department prefers to be associated with only one server, although it is indifferent between
the servers. In this case, an allocation problem has two components or stages. First, the university has to
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Gensemer, Hong, and Kelly (1996, 1998) analyze a similar environment where agents
with single-peaked preferences are partitioned into several “islands” in each of which a given
rule allocates the island’s social endowment among its inhabitants. The authors introduce a
concept of “migration equilibrium” which requires that no agent be better-off by migrating
from their current island to another. They show that if the allocation rules used by the
islands satisfy certain desirable properties, migration equilibria can fail to exist.6
While Gensemer et al (1996, 1998) question the “stability” implications of allocation
rules, we question the efficiency implications. We suppose it is institutionally feasible to
enforce a partition of the agents to the estates (e.g. consider the migration barriers used
by countries). We then focus on the possibility of constructing efficient rules for the multi-
estate division problem.7 Such rules have two components: a matching rule that assigns the
agents to the estates, and a (single-estate) allocation rule used in each estate.8
Our purpose is to understand if well-known single-estate rules, such as the Uniform rule,
the Proportional rule or the fixed-path rules can be coupled with a matching rule so as to
achieve efficiency in the multi-estate level. Our first result is encouraging to this end. In
Proposition 3.1, we observe that on the class of problems where all agents have symmetric
preferences, any efficient single-estate rule can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule.
Furthermore, we construct a matching rule whose combination with any efficient single-
assign departments to servers, and then divide the total capacity of each server amongst the departments
being serviced by the server.
6More specifically, the 1996 paper analyzes allocation rules that satisfy two of Pareto efficiency, strategy
proofness, and no-envy. The 1998 paper analyzes the Proportional, Queueing, Uniform, and Egalitarian
rules.
7An allocation is multi-estate (Pareto) efficient if no alternative way of partitioning the agents and
allocating the estates makes an agent better-off without making any other worse-off. Unlike in single-estate
problems where efficiency is equivalent to all agents’ consuming at the same side of their peaks, an efficient
multi-estate allocation can be such that there is excess supply in one estate and excess demand in the other
(thus agents in different estates are consuming at the opposite sides of their peaks).
8Note that our problem is technically a hybrid of one-sided many-to-one matching and single-estate
allocation problems. The issues involved thus resemble those in both problems.
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estate allocation rule produces multi-estate efficiency.
The positive conclusions of Proposition 3.1 do not hold on the full preference domain.
Not all single-estate rules can be coupled with a matching rule so as to achieve multi-estate
efficiency. In Theorem 3.1, we observe that all nondictatorial fixed-path rules suffer from
this problem.9 The Uniform rule is also a fixed-path rule. Therefore, a simple corollary of
our theorem establishes the impossibility of multi-estate efficiency if the Uniform rule is used
at the single-estate level.
In Theorem 3.2, we analyze single-estate rules that satisfy an informational simplicity
property called peak-only. This property requires a single-estate rule only to depend on
the agents’ most preferred consumption levels (that is, their peaks). In real-life applications,
using more information than the agents’ peaks is not practical. Thus, most of the well-known
rules satisfy this property.10 The fixed-path rules as well as others, such as the Proportional
rule, are all peak-only. We show that any peak-only single-estate rule that satisfies a very
weak fairness condition (which requires agents with “extreme demands” not to be fully
compensated) violates multi-estate efficiency.
In the above results, we impose all axioms (except efficiency) on the single-estate rules.
This is logically weaker than imposing the multi-estate formulations of the same axioms on
multi-estate rules. That is, if a multi-estate rule satisfies one of our axioms, then so does its
9We in fact prove this result for all single estate rules that satisfy efficiency, strategy proofness, consistency,
and resource monotonicity. On a related domain, Moulin (1999) shows that these properties characterize
the fixed-path rules. On our domain, all fixed-path rules satisfy these properties but there might be other
rules that also do satisfy them.
10On a related note, the literature also contains models where a social endowment is to be allocated among
a group of agents each equipped with a demand scalar (as opposed to a preference relation). For more, see
Thomson (1995) and Moulin (2000).
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single-estate component.11 But the converse is not true.12 Therefore, theorems 3.1 and 3.2
also state the lack of multi-estate rules that satisfy the given axioms.
2 Model
There is a finite set N of potential agents. Assume |N | ≥ 4. A society is a finite subset N
of N . The consumption space is denoted by Z = [0, 1]. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with
a preference relation Ri over Z. Let Pi (Ii) be the strict preference (indifference) relation
corresponding to Ri. A preference relation Ri is single-peaked if there is p(Ri) ∈ Z, the
peak of Ri, such that for all x, y ∈ Z, x < y ≤ p(Ri) or x > y ≥ p(Ri) implies yPix. Let R
be the set of all single-peaked preference relations on Z. A single-peaked preference relation
R ∈ R is symmetric if for each x, y ∈ Z, |x − p(R)| = |y − p(R)| implies xIy. Let Rsym
be the set of all symmetric preference relations on Z. Given N ⊂ N , a preference profile
RN is a list (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R. The set of all such profiles is RN .
Given RN ∈ RN , p(RN) = (p(Ri))i∈N . For x ∈ RN , p(RN) > x means that for all i ∈ N ,
p(Ri) > xi.
A single-estate economy for N is a preference profile RN ∈ RN and an endow-
ment scalar ω ∈ Z.13 Let EN1 denote the set of all single-estate economies (RN , ω). Let
E1=
S
N⊂N
EN1 . A single-estate (allocation) rule is a function f : E1 −→
S
N⊂N
ZN that
satisfies
P
i∈N fi(RN , ω) = ω for all (RN , ω) ∈ E1. Note that the definition of f allows the
allocation method to depend on the coalition for which it is being used.
We will next introduce some basic properties for such rules. A single-estate rule f is
11This is simply due to the existence of degenerate multi-estate problems where there is only one estate
with a positive social endowment (please see Section 2). A multi-estate rule coincides with its single-estate
component on this subdomain. Therefore, any property satisfied by a multi-estate rule on this subdomain
passes on to its single-estate component.
12For example, consider a multi-estate rule which is a combination of the Uniform (single-estate) rule and
a matching rule where the agents with symmetric preferences have dictatorial power. This multi-estate rule
is manipulable though it is strategy-proof on the single estate level.
13The only difference between our domain and that of Sprumont (1991) is that he fixes ω = 1.
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(Pareto) efficient if for all (RN , ω) ∈ E1, there is no x ∈ ZN with
P
i∈N xi = ω such that for
all i ∈ N , xiRifi(RN , ω) and for some i ∈ N , xiPifi(RN , ω). For single-estate rules, Pareto
efficiency is equivalent to the following property (Sprumont, 1991): for all (RN , ω) ∈ E1,
ω ≤
P
N p(Ri) [ω ≥
P
N p(Ri)] implies fi(RN , ω) ≤ p(Ri) [fi(RN , ω) ≥ p(Ri)] for all i ∈ N .
Our next property rules out individual manipulations by requiring that no agent is better-
off by misrepresenting his preference information: a single-estate rule f is strategy proof
if for all (RN , ω) ∈ E1, i ∈ N , and R0i ∈ R; fi(Ri, R−i, ω) Rifi(R0i, R−i, ω).
Moulin (1999) introduces a new class of single-estate rules which can be described as
follows. For each N ⊆ N , an N-path, g(N) : Z → ZN satisfies14 (a) for each λ ∈ Z,P
N gi(N,λ) = λ and for each i ∈ N , gi(N,λ) ≤ λ and (b) for each λ, λ
0 ∈ Z such that
λ ≤ λ0 and for each i ∈ N , gi(N,λ) ≤ gi(N,λ0). Let γ(g(N)) denote the range of g(N).
That is, γ(g(N)) = {g(N, λ) | λ ∈ Z}. A full path g = (g(N))N⊆N specifies for each
N ⊆ N , an N-path and satisfies (c) for each N ⊆ N 0 ⊆ N , projN [γ(g(N 0))] = γ(g(N)).
For each pair of full paths, g+ and g−, the associated fixed-path rule φ(g
+,g−) is defined as
follows. For each (RN , ω) ∈ E1, (i) if ω ≤
P
N p(Rj), there is λ ∈ Z such that for each i ∈ N ,
φ
(g+,g−)
i (RN , ω) = min{p(Ri), g+i (N,λ)} and
P
N min{p(Ri), g+i (N, λ)} = ω; and (ii) if ω >P
N p(Rj), there is λ ∈ Z such that for each i ∈ N , φ
(g+,g−)
i (RN , ω) = max{p(Ri), g−i (N, λ)}
and
P
N max{p(Ri), g−i (N,λ)} = ω.
All fixed-path rules satisfy efficiency, strategy proofness as well as the following two
properties. The first property requires that an increase in the social endowment never results
in a decrease in someone’s share: a single-estate rule f is resource monotonic (Thomson,
1994a) if for each (RN , ω), (RN , ω0) ∈ E1 such that ω < ω0, we have fi(RN , ω) ≤ fi(RN , ω0)
for each i ∈ N .15 The second property ensures that an agent i leaving the economy with
his assigned share does not affect the remaining agents’ shares: a single-estate rule f is
consistent (Thomson, 1994b) if for all N ⊂ N , (RN , ω) ∈ EN1 , and i ∈ N , fN\{i}(RN , ω) =
14Abusing notation, for λ ∈ Z we write g(N,λ) instead of g(N)(λ).
15More precisely, Thomson (1994a) discusses a version of this property which requires that, in response
to a change in the social endowment, the “welfare” (as opposed to the share) of all agents be affected in the
same direction.
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fN\{i}(RN\{i}, ω − fi(RN , ω)).
The following property requires a rule only to use “simple” information about the agents:
a single-estate rule f is peak-only if for each (RN , ω), (R0N , ω) ∈ E1, p(RN) = p(R0N)
implies f(RN , ω) = f(R0N , ω). In real-life problems, it is much more practical to ask the
agents to declare a most preferred amount rather than a whole preference relation. Thus
most well-known rules, such as the Proportional rule or the fixed-path rules, are peak-only.
These rules also satisfy the following property which requires that small perturbations in
the data of a problem do not have a big effect on the agents’ shares. Let λ be the Lebesque
measure on Z. The metric δ : R2 → R+ is defined as follows: for R,R0 ∈ R, δ(R,R0) =
maxx∈Z |λ({y ∈ Z | yRx})− λ({y ∈ Z | yR0x})|. GivenN ⊂ N , the metric δN : RN×RN →
R+ is defined as follows: for RN , R0N ∈ RN , δN(RN , R0N) = maxi∈N δ(Ri, R0i). A single-estate
rule f is continuous if for each (RN , ω) ∈ E1 and ε > 0, there is ζ > 0 such that for each
R0N ∈ RN , δN(RN , R0N) < ζ implies
P
i∈N (fi(RN , ω)− fi(R0N , ω))
2
< ε.
The following property rules out dictatoriality: a single-estate rule f is nondictatorial
if there is no N ⊂ N with |N | > 1, i ∈ N , and ω ∈ Z such that either (i) for all RN ∈ RN
with
P
N p(Rj) > ω, fi(RN , ω) = min{ω, p(Ri)} (i.e. agent i dictates when there is excess
demand) or (ii) for all RN ∈ RN with
P
N p(Rj) < ω, fi(RN , ω) = p(Ri) (i.e. agent i
dictates when there is excess supply).
The focus of our paper is on economies where there are multiple estates of the same
commodity. Let S be the (finite) set of estates and assume 2 ≤ |S| ≤ |N |. An endowment
vector is denoted by Ω = (Ω1, ...,Ω|S|) ∈ Z |S|. For |N | ≥ |S|, a multi-estate economy for
N is a preference profile RN ∈ RN and an endowment vector Ω ∈ Z |S| \ {0}. Let EN denote
the set of all multi-estate economies (RN ,Ω). Let E=
S
N⊂N
|N |≥|S|
EN . Let Esym be the subset of
multi-estate problems where every agent has symmetric preferences. The set of all feasible
allocations for (RN ,Ω) ∈ E is
X(RN ,Ω) = {x ∈ ZN | for some partition [M1, ...,M|S|] of N,
X
i∈Mk
xi = Ωk, k ∈ S}.
Amulti-estate rule Φ is a combination of (i) a (matching) rule that assigns the agents
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to the estates and (ii) a single-estate (allocation) rule that distributes each estate among the
agents assigned to it. Amatching rule µ associates each N ⊂ N and (RN ,Ω) ∈ EN with a
partition ofN , µ(RN ,Ω) = [µ1(RN ,Ω), ..., µ|S|(RN ,Ω)] such that for each k ∈ S, µk(RN ,Ω) =
∅ if and only if Ωk = 0.16 A multi-estate rule is a function Φ : E →
S
(RN ,Ω)∈E
X(RN ,Ω) that,
for a single-estate rule f and a matching rule µ, satisfies
Φj(RN ,Ω) = fj(Rµk(RN ,Ω),Ωk) if j ∈ µk(RN ,Ω)
for each (RN ,Ω) ∈ E and j ∈ N . We denote this with Φ = (f, µ).
Let Edeg be the set of degenerate multi-estate problems (RN ,Ω) where exactly one
estate has a positive endowment, that is, there is k ∈ S such that Ωk > 0 and for all
l ∈ S \ {k}, Ωl = 0. By definition of a matching rule, the multi-estate rule Φ coincides with
its single-estate component f on the subdomain Edeg, that is, Φ |Edeg= f .
We are primarily interested in efficiency. A multi-estate rule Φ is efficient if for all
N ⊂ N and (RN ,Ω) ∈ EN , there exists no z ∈ X(RN ,Ω) such that zkRkΦk(RN ,Ω) for
all k ∈ N and zlPlΦl(RN ,Ω) for some l ∈ N . It follows from the previous paragraph that
every efficient multi-estate rule Φ = (f, µ) induces an efficient single-estate rule f . For
efficiency of a multi-estate rule, how it partitions the agents is very important: a partition
[N1, ..., N|S|] of N is a critical partition if for any k, l ∈ S satisfying
P
Nk
p(Ri) > ωk andP
Nl
p(Ri) < ωl, there is no j ∈ Nk such that
P
Nk\{j} p(Ri) ≥ ωk and
P
Nl∪{j} p(Ri) ≤ ωl.
Note that any allocation that is not associated with a critical partition is bound to be Pareto
dominated. This can be done by moving an agent (such as j in the definition) from an excess
demand estate to an excess supply estate (from estate k to l in the definition); this move
increases what is left to the others in the excess demand estate and decreases what is left to
the others in the excess supply estate.
16This condition restricts the matching rule not to assign agents to empty estates (and to assign at least
one agent to each nonempty estate). However, it does not restrict the set of feasible allocations: if there
were agents assigned to an empty estate, each would have received a zero share. Thus these agents can
equivalently be assigned to a nonempty estate and get the same (zero) amount.
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3 Results
In this paper we ask the following simple question. Is it possible to achieve an efficient
allocation of the estates in S if we restrict ourselves to a class of well-behaved single-estate
rules? In other words, we impose several desirable properties over f and investigate whether
a matching rule µ can be constructed to obtain an efficient multi-estate rule Φ = (f, µ).
We first observe that if the agents have symmetric preferences, any efficient single-estate
rule can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule.
Proposition 3.1 On Esym, there is a matching rule µ such that for every efficient single-
estate rule f , the multi-estate rule Φ = (f, µ) is efficient.
Proof : Let the matching rule µ be defined as follows: for each RN ∈ RNsym, µ(RN ,Ω) is a
partition of N that minimizes X
k∈S
|Ωk −
X
j∈Πk
p(Rj)|
over all partitions Π = [Π1, ...,Π|S|] of N .
Let f be any efficient single-estate allocation rule. We define a multi-estate rule Φ =
(f, µ). Let (RN ,Ω) ∈ E and let x = Φ(RN ,Ω).
Note that,
P
k∈S |Ωk −
P
j∈Πk p(Rj)| =
P
k∈S |
P
j∈Πk(xj − p(Rj))|. For all k, due to
efficiency of single-estate rules, the expression (xj − p(Rj)) has the same sign for all j ∈ Πk.
Hence X
k∈S
|Ωk −
X
j∈Πk
p(Rj)| =
X
i∈N
|xi − p(Ri)|.
Suppose x is Pareto dominated by an allocation y. Then for all i ∈ N , |yi − p(Ri)| ≤
|xi − p(Ri)|, with strict inequality for at least one agent. Thus,X
i∈N
|yi − p(Ri)| <
X
i∈N
|xi − p(Ri)|.
Without loss of generality we can assume that y is efficient, corresponding to a partition Π0.
Then the same steps as above show that,X
i∈N
|yi − p(Ri)| =
X
k∈S
|Ωk −
X
j∈Π0k
p(Rj)|.
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This however, impliesX
k∈S
|Ωk −
X
j∈Π0k
p(Rj)| <
X
k∈S
|Ωk −
X
j∈µk(RN ,Ω)
p(Rj)|,
a contradiction.
In the proof of Proposition 3.1, we construct a matching rule that picks certain critical
partitions. These partitions make use of the very particular structure of symmetric pref-
erences (where an agent, independent of whether he receives more or less than his peak,
becomes better-off as the distance between his peak and his share decreases).
Proposition 3.1 fails on the full domain of preferences. The following theorem implies
that nondictatorial fixed-path rules can not be coupled with a matching rule so as to achieve
multi-estate efficiency. All fixed-path rules satisfy efficiency, strategy proofness, resource
monotonicity and consistency.17 We thus proceed to show that a nondictatorial single-
estate rule that satisfies these properties can not be combined with a matching rule to
satisfy multi-estate efficiency.
Theorem 3.1 For every single-estate rule f that is efficient, nondictatorial, strategy proof,
resource monotonic, and consistent, there is no matching rule µ such that Φ = (f, µ) is
efficient in multi-estate problems.
The proof makes use of the following lemmata. The first two, due to Ching (1994), are
very useful in identifying the implications of two central properties, efficiency and strategy
proofness, on single-estate rules. Next, we present them without proof.
Lemma 3.1 (Lemma 1 in Ching, 1994) Let f satisfy efficiency and strategy proofness.
Then for each N ⊂ N , i ∈ N, and (Ri, R−i, ω), (R0i, R−i, ω) ∈ EN1 , if p(Ri) ≤ p(R0i), then
fi(Ri, R−i, ω) ≤ fi(R0i, R−i, ω).
17On a slightly different domain, Moulin (1999) and Ehlers (2002) show that these properties characterize
the class of fixed-path rules. On their domain, the consumption set of each agent i is [0,Xi] for some
Xi ∈ R++ (while we normalize all Xi = 1) and ω ∈ [0,
P
N Xi] (while we restrict ω ∈ [0, 1]). Due to these
differences, their uniqueness proof does not directly apply to our domain (e.g., see Ehlers (2002), Lemma
3.2, where he uses the intermediate value theorem).
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It follows from this lemma that if p(Ri) = p(R0i), then fi(Ri, R−i, ω) = fi(R
0
i, R−i, ω).
Lemma 3.2 (Lemma 2 in Ching, 1994) Let f satisfy efficiency and strategy proofness.
Then for each N ⊂ N , i ∈ N, and (Ri, R−i, ω), (R0i, R−i, ω) ∈ EN1 ,
(i) if p(Ri) < fi(Ri, R−i, ω) and p(R0i) ≤ fi(Ri, R−i, ω), then fi(R0i, R−i, ω) = fi(Ri, R−i, ω),
(ii) if p(Ri) > fi(Ri, R−i, ω) and p(R0i) ≥ fi(Ri, R−i, ω), then fi(R0i, R−i, ω) = fi(Ri, R−i, ω).
The following two lemmata identify the implications of nondictatoriality on efficient and
strategy proof rules. Please see the Appendix for their proofs. The first lemma states that
in two-agent economies, for each agent there is a limit such that he is allotted his peak if
and only if his peak is inside this limit.
Lemma 3.3 Let f be an efficient, strategy proof, and nondictatorial single-estate rule. Let
N = {1, 2}. Then for each ω ∈ Z \ {0} and i ∈ N , there is mdi (N,ω) ∈ (0, ω) and
msi (N,ω) ∈ (0, ω) such that for any RN ∈ RN ,
if p(R1) + p(R2) > ω, then
£
p(Ri) > m
d
i (N,ω)⇔ fi(RN , ω) < p(Ri)
¤
and
if p(R1) + p(R2) < ω, then [p(Ri) < msi (N,ω)⇔ fi(RN , ω) > p(Ri)] .
For more than two agents, the issue becomes much more complicated since fixing the share
of an agent no longer determines the shares of the others. Nevertheless, a similar implication
holds for rules that additionally satisfy continuity and consistency. The following lemma
states that if we fix the preferences of all agents other than two, say i and j, then in excess
supply problems there is a limit for i such that if his peak is under this limit (no matter what
the preferences of j are) i can not be allotted his peak. Nondictatoriality of f corresponds
to this limit being in the interior of Z.
Lemma 3.4 Let f be an efficient, strategy proof, consistent, continuous, and nondictatorial
single-estate rule . Then for each N ⊂ N , ω ∈ Z, i ∈ N, j ∈ N \{i}, and RN\{i,j} ∈ RN\{i,j}
12
satisfying p(RN\{i,j}) > 0, there ismsi ({i, j}, RN\{i,j}, ω) ∈ (0, ω) such that for any Ri, Rj ∈ R
if
X
N
p(Rk) < ω, then
£
p(Ri) < m
s
i ({i, j}, RN\{i,j}, ω)⇒ fi(RN , ω) > p(Ri)
¤
.
Note that the observation of Lemma 3.4 holds for all nondictatorial fixed-path rules. We
next prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Assume that f is efficient, nondictatorial, strategy proof, resource
monotonic, and consistent. Then , f is also continuous.18 As a result, lemmas 3.3 and 3.4
apply to f . We prove the theorem in two steps. In Step 1, we construct an economy with two
estates and agents |N | ≥ 4. In Step 2, we extend this economy to another with an arbitrary
number of (say m) estates and agents |N | ≥ m+ 2.
Step 1: We construct a two estate problem for which any allocation that Φ can choose
is Pareto dominated. First, let Ω = (ω, ω) where ω > 0. Let n ≥ 4, N = {1, 2, . . . , n},
N 0 = N \ {n}, and Nˆ = N 0 \ {1, 2, 3}. Define
D = {p ∈ ZN 0 |
X
N 0
pk > ω and for all l ∈ N 0,
X
N 0\{l}
pk < ω}.
Note that for all p ∈ D and l ∈ N 0, pl > 0. Let RN 0 ∈ RN 0 be such that p(RN 0) ∈ D.
We first claim that for each k ∈ N 0, fk(RN 0 , ω) > 0. For this, note that by efficiency, for
each k ∈ N 0, fk(RN 0 , ω) ≤ p(Rk). Suppose there is l ∈ N 0 such that fl(RN 0 , ω) = 0. ThenP
N 0 fk(RN 0 , ω) =
P
N 0\{l} fk(RN 0 , ω) ≤
P
N 0\{l} p(Rk) < ω, a contradiction to the definition
of a single estate rule.
Then by efficiency of f and by the definition of D, there is i ∈ N 0 such that
0 < fi(RN 0 , ω) < p(Ri). (1)
Without loss of generality assume that i = 1.
18Since f is efficient and strategy proof, a similar argument to Lemma 1 in Sprumont (1991) establishes
that fi(Ri, RN\i, ω) is continuous in Ri. Also, by resource monotonicity, fj(Ri, RN\i, ω) is continuous in ω.
Since (ω− fi(Ri, RN\i, ω)) is continuous in Ri, fj(RN\i, ω − fi(Ri, RN\i, ω)) is also continuous in Ri. Thus
by consistency, fj(Ri, RN\i, ω) is continuous in Ri.
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We next construct a preference profile R∗N ∈ RN that satisfies two lists of properties:
A1 to A5 and B1 to B4. Inequality (1), Lemma 3.3, and Lemma 3.4 ensure that, for each
inequality stated in properties A1 to A5, the right hand side is strictly between 0 and ω (and
thus, the inequality is well-defined).
A1. For each k ∈ Nˆ , let R∗k be such that 0 < p(R∗k) < min{mdk({k, n}, ω), fk(RN 0 , ω)}.
By Lemma 3.3, p(R∗k) < m
d
k({k, n}, ω) implies that agent k gets his peak. Thus A1
ensures that if only two agents, k and n, are assigned to one of the estates and if they
happen to be in excess demand, then agent k gets his peak.
A2. Let R∗3 be such that 0 < p(R
∗
3) < min{ms3({1, 3}, R∗Nˆ , ω),md3({3, n}, ω), f3(RN 0 , ω)}.
Consider a situation where the coalition Nˆ ∪ {1, 3} has been assigned to one of the
estates and the preference profile for Nˆ is R∗
Nˆ
. If this coalition happens to be in excess
supply, then by Lemma 3.4, p(R∗3) < m
s
3({1, 3}, R∗Nˆ , ω) guarantees that agent 3 does
not get his peak. Similarly if only two agents, k and n, are assigned to an estate and
if they happen to be in excess demand, then by Lemma 3.3, p(R∗3) < m
d
3({3, n}, ω)
guarantees that agent 3 will get his peak.
A3. Let R∗2 be such that
0 < p(R∗2) < min



mink∈N 0\{1,2}{ms2({1, 2}, R∗N 0\{1,2,k}, ω), p(R∗k)},
ms2({2, 3}, R∗Nˆ , ω), md2({2, n}, ω), f2(RN 0 , ω), p(R1)


 .
Take any k ∈ N 0 \ {1, 2}. Consider a situation where the coalition N 0 \ {k} has been
assigned to one of the estates and the preference profile for N 0 \{1, 2, k} is R∗N 0\{1,2,k}. If this
coalition happens to be in excess supply, then by Lemma 3.4, p(R∗2) < m
s
2({1, 2}, R∗N 0\{1,2,k}, ω)
guarantees that agent 2 does not get his peak. Moreover, p(R∗2) < p(R
∗
k) implies that agent 2
has the smallest peak of {2, ..., n−1}. By Lemma 3.4, p(R∗2) < ms2({2, 3}, R∗Nˆ , ω) guarantees
that if the coalition N 0 \{1} is assigned to an estate, if the preference profile of Nˆ is R∗
Nˆ
, and
if this coalition is in excess supply then agent 2 does not get his peak. Similarly by Lemma
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3.3, p(R∗2) < m
d
2({2, n}, ω) guarantees that agent 2 will get his peak when only two agents,
2 and n, are sharing an estate and they are in excess demand.
A4. Let R∗1 be such that p(R
∗
1) ≥ p(R1) and p(R∗N 0) ∈ D.19
Note that p(R∗N 0) ∈ D implies that for all k ∈ N 0, the coalition N 0 \ k is in excess
supply and hence, we can later apply A2 and A3.
A5. Let R∗n be such that ω > p(R
∗
n) > max{mdn({1, n}, ω), maxj∈N 0{ω − p(R∗j)}}.
By Lemma 3.3, p(R∗n) > m
d
n({1, n}, ω) guarantees that agent n will not get his peak
when only two agents, 1 and n, are sharing an estate and they are in excess demand. The
inequality p(R∗n) > maxj∈N 0{ω − p(R∗j )} implies that agent n will be in an excess demand
situation with each agent j ∈ N 0 and by A1, A2, and A3, will not get his peak.
Claim. f1(R∗N 0 , ω) < p(R
∗
1) and for each i ∈ N 0 \ {1}, fi(R∗N 0 , ω) = p(R∗i ).
Proof of Claim.
First note that f1(RN 0,ω) < p(R1) ≤ p(R∗1) (by Inequality (1) and A4, respectively).
At the profile (R∗1, RN 0\1), the coalition N
0 is at excess demand. Thus, by Lemma 3.2,
f1(R
∗
{1}, R{2,...,n−1}, ω) = f1(R{1,...,n−1}, ω) < p(R
∗
1). By consistency
f(R∗{1}, RN 0\1, ω) = f(RN 0 , ω) (2)
For each i ∈ N 0\{1}, let R0i be such that p(R0i) = fi(R∗{1}, R{2,...,n−1}, ω). Thus p(R´i) ≤ p(Ri).
Now consider agent i changing his preference relation toR0i at profile (R
∗
1, R
0
{2,...,i−1}, R{i,...,n−1}).
Both of these profiles create excess demand since
p(R∗1) +
iX
j=2
p(R´j) +
n−1X
j=i+1
p(Rj) = p(R
∗
1) +
iX
j=2
fj(R
∗
{1}, R{2,...,n−1}, ω) +
n−1X
j=i+1
p(Rj) > ω.
By Lemma 3.2, fi(R∗1, R
0
{2,...,i−1}, R{i,...,n−1}, ω) = fi(R
∗
1, R
0
{2,...,i}, R{i+1,...,n−1}, ω). Then by
consistency fN 0(R∗1, R
0
{2,...,i−1}, R{i,...,n−1}, ω) = fN 0(R
∗
1, R
0
{2,...,i}, R{i+1,...,n−1}, ω). Iteratively
19Note that this is possible since for all k ∈ N 0 \ {1}, p(R∗k) < fk(RN 0 , ω) ≤ p(Rk).
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applying this argument to agents 2, 3, ..., (n− 1) gives us
f(R∗{1}, R
0
{2,...,n−1}, ω) = f(R
∗
{1}, R{2,...,n−1}, ω).
Therefore, f1(R∗{1}, R
0
{2,...,n−1}, ω) < p(R
∗
1) and
fN 0\{1}(R∗{1}, R
0
{2,...,n−1}, ω) = (p(R
0
2), ...., p(R
0
n−1)). (3)
We next show that fN 0\{1}(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = (p(R
∗
2), p(R
0
3), ..., p(R
0
n−1)). By proper-
ties A1, A2, A3, and Equation (2), for all i ∈ N 0 \ {1},
p(R∗i ) < fi(RN 0 , ω) = fi(R
∗
{1}, RN 0\1, ω) = p(R
0
i).
This and
P
N 0 p(R
∗
i ) > ω implies, by A4, that
p(R∗1) + p(R
∗
2) +
X
N 0
p(R0i) > ω. (4)
Then by efficiency, f2(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) ≤ p(R∗2). Suppose, f2(R∗{1,2}, R0{3,...,n−1}, ω) <
p(R∗2). Let R
∗∗
2 ∈ R be such that p(R∗∗2 ) = p(R∗2) and p(R02)P ∗∗2 f2(R∗{1,2}, R0{3,...,n−1}, ω).
Then by Lemma 3.1
f2(R
∗
1, R
∗∗
2 , R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = f2(R
∗
{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω)
implies p(R02)P
∗∗
2 f2(R
∗
1, R
∗∗
2 , R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω). This contradicts strategy proofness. Therefore,
f2(R
∗
{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = p(R
∗
2) (5)
Now by consistency,
fN 0\{2}(R∗{1}, R
0
{2,...,n−1}, ω) = fN 0\{2}(R
∗
{1}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R02)) (6)
and
fN 0\{2}(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = fN 0\{2}(R
∗
{1}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R∗2)). (7)
Note that ω − p(R∗2) > ω − p(R02). Thus, by resource monotonicity
fN 0\{2}(R∗{1}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R02)) ≤ fN 0\{2}(R∗{1}, R0{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R∗2)) (8)
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Now,
fN 0\{1,2}(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = fN 0\{1,2}(R
∗
{1}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R∗2)) (by (7) )
≥ fN 0\{1,2}(R∗{1}, R0{3,...,n−1}, ω − p(R02)) (by (8) )
= fN 0\{1,2}(R∗{1}, R
0
{2,...,n−1}, ω) (by (6) )
≥ (p(R03), ..., p(R0n−1)) (by (3) ).
But, from (4), we know that the profile (R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}) is in excess demand and hence by
efficiency
fN 0\{1,2}(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = (p(R
0
3), ..., p(R
0
n−1)). (9)
Then, by equalities (5) and (9), fN 0\{1}(R∗{1,2}, R
0
{3,...,n−1}, ω) = (p(R
∗
2), p(R
0
3), ..., p(R
0
n−1)).
An iterative application of this argument for i ∈ {3, ..., n− 1}, thus gives
fN 0\{1}(R∗{1,...,n−1}, ω) = (p(R
∗
2), ..., p(R
∗
n−1)).
Since by A4,
P
N 0 p(R
∗
j ) > ω, feasibility implies f1(R
∗
N 0 , ω) < p(R
∗
1). (Claim)
Other properties of the agents’ preferences are as follows. Due to Lemma 3.1, changing
an agent’s preferences without changing his peak does not affect his share assigned by a
single-estate rule. Furthermore, due to consistency, such a change does not affect the shares
of others as well. Instead of creating a new preference profile with the same peaks as R∗
and stating each time that, as above, the agents’ shares remain unchanged, we will abuse
notation and state these properties directly on R∗. After each property, we state why it is
compatible with those in A1 to A5.
B1. If f1(R∗{1,n}, ω) = p(R
∗
1), let (ω −
P
Nˆ∪{3} p(R
∗
k)) P
∗
1 f1(R
∗
N 0 , ω). Otherwise, let (ω −P
Nˆ∪{3} p(R
∗
k)) P
∗
1 max{f1(R∗N 0 , ω), f1(R∗{1,n}, ω)}.
By A4, ω −
P
Nˆ∪{3} p(R
∗
k) > p(R
∗
1). By the Claim, p(R
∗
1) > f1(R
∗
N 0 , ω). Thus, B1 does
not contradict the previous properties.
B2. min{ω −PN 0\{2} p(R∗k), ω − p(R∗n)} P ∗2 mink∈N 0\{2}{f2(R∗N 0\{k}, ω)}.
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By A4 and A5, min{ω −PN 0\{2} p(R∗k), ω − p(R∗n)} < p(R∗2). Since by A3 p(R∗2) <
mink∈N 0\{1,2}{ms2({1, 2}, R∗N 0\{1,2,k}, ω), p(R∗k)}, we have p(R∗2) < mink∈N 0\{2}{f2(R∗N 0\{k}, ω)}.
B3. (ω −
P
N 0\{3} p(R
∗
k)) P
∗
3 f3(R
∗
N 0\{2}, ω).
By A4, ω −
P
k∈N 0\{3} p(R
∗
k) < p(R
∗
3) and by A2, p(R
∗
3) < f3(R
∗
N 0\{2}, ω).
B4. (ω − p(R∗2)) I∗n ω.
By A5, ω − p(R∗2) < p(R∗n) < ω.
Note that by A3 and A4, p(R∗2) < p(R
∗
1). Also, by A3, p(R
∗
2) < p(R
∗
k) for all k ∈ N 0 \{1}.
Thus for all k ∈ N 0, ω − p(R∗2) > ω − p(R∗k). Therefore, an important implication of B4 is
that ωP ∗n(ω − p(R∗k)) for all k ∈ N 0.
Now we will show that allocations under every possible partition can be Pareto dom-
inated. Since Ω1 = Ω2 = ω, partitions [N1, N2] and [N2, N1] are the same. The critical
partitions are as follows:
1. [N 0 \ {k}, {k, n}] for all k ∈ Nˆ ∪ {3},
2. [N 0 \ {2}, {2, n}],
3. [N 0 \ {1}, {1, n}],
4. [N 0, {n}].
Now consider any partition of type 1 and the following allocation z which is consistent
with partition [N 0, {n}]:
zk =



p(R∗k) if k 6= 2, n,
ω −
P
N 0\{2} p(R
∗
k) if k = 2,
ω if k = n.
Now for each k ∈ N \ {1, 2, n}, by A1, fn(R∗{k,n}, ω) = ω− p(R∗k) and by B4, he is better-off
at z. Also note that agent 2, by B2, is better-off at z. Finally, in z every agent k ∈ N \{2, n}
receives his peak. Therefore, z is a Pareto improvement.
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Now consider Partition 2 and the following alternative allocation y which is consistent
with [N 0, {n}]:
yk =



p(R∗k) if k 6= 3, n,
ω −
P
N 0\{3} p(R
∗
k) if k = 3,
ω if k = n.
By A3, fn(R∗{2,n}, ω) = ω − p(R∗2) and by B4, n is indifferent. By B3, agent 3 is strictly
better-off. Finally, the rest are getting their peaks at y. So y is a Pareto improvement.
There are two possible scenarios under Partition 3. If f1(R∗{1,n}, ω) = p(R
∗
1) then as
before, z Pareto dominates this allocation. Alternatively if f1(R∗{1,n}, ω) < p(R
∗
1), consider
the following allocation x which is consistent with [N 0 \ {2}, {2, n}]:
xk =



p(R∗k) if k 6= 1, 2,
ω −
P
N 0\{1,2} p(R
∗
k) if k = 1,
ω − p(R∗n) if k = 2.
Now by B1, agent 1 is strictly better-off and by B2, agent 2 is strictly better-off. All the
other agents are getting their peaks at x. So x is a Pareto improvement.
Finally consider Partition 4 and the following allocation v which is consistent with the
partition [N 0 \ {2}, {2, n}]:
vk =



p(R∗k) if k 6= 1, n,
ω −
P
N 0\{1,2} p(R
∗
k) if k = 1,
ω − p(R∗2) if k = n.
By B4, agent n is indifferent. By B1, agent 1 is strictly better-off. Finally, all the other
agents are getting their peaks at v. Thus v is a Pareto improvement.
Step 2: Here we extend the economy of Step 1 to another with an arbitrary number of estates.
Let m > 2 be the number of estates and let N be the set of agents, where |N | ≥ m+2. The
following were the critical partitions in the two estate problem.
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1. [N 0 \ {k}, {k, n}] for all k ∈ Nˆ ∪ {3},
2. [N 0 \ {2}, {2, n}],
3. [N 0 \ {1}, {1, n}],
4. [N 0, {n}].
We know that for all k ∈ N 0, the N 0 \ {k} coalitions are in excess supply and the {k, n}
coalitions are in excess demand. SimilarlyN 0 is in excess demand and {n} is in excess supply.
As [N 0, {n}] is a critical partition, PN 0 p(R∗k) > ω and for all l ∈ N 0, PN 0\{l} p(R∗k) < ω.
Now, in each excess demand situation, let us calculate the residual amount an agent will
have to consume if all others receive their peaks. So for example in partition 2, the residuals
are (ω−p(R∗n)) and (ω−p(R∗2)). Let δ be the minimum of all such numbers and p(R∗n), that
is,
δ = min{min
l∈N´
{ω − p(R∗l ), ω −
X
N 0\{l}
p(R∗k)}, ω − p(R∗n), p(R∗n)}.
Note that δ > 0. Assume that there is a 0 < θ < minl∈N p(R∗l ) such that ωP
∗
k θ for all k ∈ N .
This does not contradict with any of the previous properties.
Now pick any number of estates m ≤ min{|N | − 2, |S|} and extend the economy of
Step 1 by adding (m − 2) new estates and (m − 2) new agents. These new estates are
all of the same size ' ∈ Z, where 0 < ' < min{θ, δ}. New agents, denoted by l ∈ M =
{(n+1), ..., (n+m−2)} have identical preferences R∗ ∈ R, where p(R∗) = '. We next show
that in any efficient partition, each of the new agents will be assigned to one new estate.
Suppose this is not true. Then one new estate must have been assigned to some agent j ∈ N
and one new agent l ∈ M is part of a coalition K ⊂ N ∪M \ {j} that occupies one of
the two original estates. (More than one agent in any new estate is an inefficient partition,
because such partition is not critical). We next create an alternative multi-estate allocation
x ∈ ZN∪M as follows. We swap agents j and l and we keep all other agents in the same
estate as before. After the swap, we give agent l his peak, xl = p(R∗). We also give the new
coalition members of j their peaks, xk = p(R∗k) for all k ∈ K \ {l}, and we give agent j the
residual, xj = ω −
P
k∈K\{l} xk. Finally, we give all other agents the same share as before.
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Note that, for all agents other than j, the new allocation is weakly preferred to the old one.
We will next show that agent j strictly prefers his new share xj to his old one '. There are
two possibilities.
Case 1)
P
k∈K∪{j} p(R
∗
k) ≥ ω (that is, agent j ends up in an excess demand coalition after
the swap). Then since ' < δ < xj ≤ p(R∗j ), we have xjP ∗j'.
Case 2)
P
k∈K∪{j} p(R
∗
k) < ω (that is, agent j ends up in an excess supply coalition after the
swap). Then p(R∗j) < xj < ω implies xjP
∗
j ω. Combining this with ωP
∗
j θ and θ > ', we
obtain xjP ∗j'.
This argument establishes that in any efficient multi-estate allocation, each new estate
must contain exactly one new agent. Thus, all agents in N must be assigned to the first
two estates (of Step 1). We are then back to Step 1 where we know an efficient multi-estate
allocation does not exist.
Since the Uniform rule is a nondictatorial fixed-path rule, a straightforward corollary
of Theorem 3.1 is that any multi-estate rule which coincides with the Uniform rule on the
single-estate level is bound to be inefficient.
There are dictatorial single-estate rules that satisfy all other properties of Theorem 3.1
and that can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. The simplest example is a priority
single-estate rule (with respect to an exogenous priority ordering of the agents) where the
agent with kth priority picks his most preferred allocations among those picked by the agent
with (k − 1)th priority. An efficient multi-estate extension of this rule is where, given the
single-estate priority allocations in each estate, the agent with kth priority picks his most
preferred matchings among those picked by the agent with (k − 1)th priority. This example
can be manipulated to construct a nondictatorial rule that satisfies all properties of Theorem
3.1 except strategy proofness and that can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. For
this, let the priority ranking be endogenously determined by ordering the agents with respect
to the magnitude of their peaks (so the agent with the highest peak gets the first priority
and so on) and by using an exogenous ordering to break the ties in peaks.
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Next, we analyze the implications of peak-only together with a weak fairness property.
This property demands that those who are most responsible for the excess (demand or
supply) must not be compensated fully. That is, in case of excess supply those who demanded
the least, and in case of excess demand those who demanded the most must not be allocated
their peaks: a single-estate rule f satisfies nonaccommodation of extremes if for all
(RN , ω) ∈ E1 and i ∈ N ,
(i)
P
N p(Rk) < ω and p(Ri) ≤ p(Rj) for all j ∈ N implies fi(RN , ω) > p(Ri), and
(ii)
P
N p(Rk) > ω and p(Ri) ≥ p(Rj) for all j ∈ N implies fi(RN , ω) < p(Ri).
This property is satisfied by well-known rules such as the Uniform rule and the Proportional
rule.
Theorem 3.2 For every single-estate rule f that satisfies efficiency, peak-only and nonac-
commodation of extremes, there is no matching rule µ such that Φ = (f, µ) is efficient in
multi-estate problems.
Proof : As in Theorem 3.1, the proof of this result is in two steps. First, we construct an
economy with two estates and with agents |N | ≥ 4 and second, we extend it to an arbitrary
number of estates. Since the second step is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, it is omitted for
brevity. We next implement the first step and construct the two-estate economy.
Suppose f satisfies the given properties. Let N = {0, 1, . . . n} and N 0 = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let Ω = (ω, ω) where ω > 0. Let η ∈ R satisfy ω
n(n−1) > η > 0. Let R = (R0, R1, . . . , Rn)
be such that p(R0) =
ω(n−1)
n
and for all i ∈ N 0, p(Ri) = ωn + η. Thus p(R0) > p(Ri) for all
i ∈ N 0.
It is easy to check that the critical partitions are as follows:
1. [{0, i}, N 0 \ {i}] for i ∈ N 0,
2. [{0}, N 0].
At partitions of type 1, {0, i} faces excess demand while N 0 \ {i} faces excess supply. At
Partition 2, N 0 faces excess demand and {0} faces excess supply.
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For each i ∈ N 0, let (xi0, xii) = f(R{0,i}, ω), (xij)j∈N 0\{i} = f(RN 0\{i},ω). Also let (x0j)j∈N 0 =
f(RN 0,ω). By efficiency and nonaccommodation of extremes, for all i ∈ N 0, xi0 < p(R0) and
for all j ∈ N 0 \ {i},
xij > p(Rj). (10)
Let x0 = maxi∈N 0{xi0} and xn = mini∈N 0\{n}{xin}. We assume that the agents’ preferences
satisfy the following properties. Note that as single-estate rules are peak-only, these assump-
tions do not have any effect on the agents’ shares.
1. x0 I0 ω.
Note that by nonaccommodation of extremes, x0 < p(R0). Also, p(R0) < ω.
2. (ω
n
− (n− 1)η) Pn xn.
By inequality (10), xn > p(Rn) and by definition of η, p(Rn) > (ωn − (n− 1)η).
3. (ω
n
− (n− 1)η) P1 xn1 .
By inequality (10), xn1 > p(R1) and by definition of η, p(R1) > (
ω
n
− (n− 1)η).
4. (2ω
n
− (n− 2)η) P2 x02.
By nonaccommodation of extremes, x02 < p(R2) and by definition of η, p(R2) < (
2ω
n
−
(n− 2)η).
Now any partition of type 1 except [{0, n}, N 0 \ {n}] can be Pareto dominated by an
allocation x, consistent with [{0}, N 0]:
xk =



ω
n
+ η if k 6= 0, n,
ω
n
− (n− 1)η if k = n,
ω if k = 0.
Note that in x, all k ∈ N 0 \ {n} receives his peak, agent n is receiving a share that by
Property 2, he prefers to any xin, and finally agent 0 receives ω which by Property 1 he
weakly prefers to all xi0.
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The allocation corresponding to partition [{0, n}, N 0 \ {n}] is Pareto dominated by the
following y which is consistent again with Partition [{0}, N 0]:
yk =



ω
n
+ η if k 6= 0, 1,
ω
n
− (n− 1)η if k = 1,
ω if k = 0.
At allocation y, all agents but 0 and 1 get their peaks. agent 1 is better-off due to Property 3.
Finally, agent 0 is strictly better-off due to Property 1. Therefore, y is a Pareto improvement.
Now we analyze Partition 2. By feasibility, there is l ∈ N 0 such that x0l ≤ ωn . This
allocation can be Pareto dominated by the following z which is consistent with Partition
[{0, l}, N 0 \ {l}]:
zk =



ω
n
+ η if k 6= 0, 2, l,
2ω
n
− (n− 2)η if k = 2,
ω − x0 if k = l,
x0 if k = 0.
By efficiency xii = ω− xi0 ≤ p(Ri), which implies ω− x0 ≤ ω− xi0 ≤ p(Ri) for all i ∈ N 0.
Particularly, ω − x0 ≤ p(Rl). Now by nonaccommodation of extremes, x0 < p(R0). Thus,
p(Rl) ≥ ω − x0 > ω − p(R0) = ωn > x0l . Therefore, (ω − x0)Plx0l . By Property 4, agent 2 is
strictly better-off and by Property 1, agent 0 is indifferent. Finally all the remaining agents
get their peaks at z and thus they are all better-off. This completes the proof.
There are peak-only single-estate rules that violate nonaccommodation of extremes and
that can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. The simplest example is a priority
rule (with respect to a fixed priority ordering).
4 Concluding comments
We assume that the agents do not have preferences on the estates. Without this assumption,
the problem gets much richer and much more complicated. One of the simpler alternative
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cases is when the agents have lexicographic preferences (e.g. say a professor ranking job offers
first looks at the name of a university and then at the teaching load). Under this assumption,
our problem gets much “closer” to matching models. The analysis of this extension should
present interesting open questions.
Finally, we focus on multi-estate rules that are “compositions” of a single-estate rule and
a matching rule. These rules all satisfy an “estate neutrality” condition (which requires that
the name of the estate does not affect the allocation method) and a “consistency” condition
(which requires that if in two different problems the same set of agents is assigned to the
same estate, those agents’ shares should also be the same).20 A formal analysis of rules that
violate these properties is left for future research. Nevertheless, we finish with an informal
discussion of estate neutrality.
Multi-estate rules that violate estate neutrality use different single-estate rules in different
estates. Thus, the number of allocations achievable via alternative matchings is much greater
than that of an estate neutral multi-estate rule and (very informally) the existence of a
preference profile where all resulting allocations are Pareto dominated becomes less likely.
In the following example, we present a two-estate problem where using the Uniform rule in
both estates leads to inefficiency, independent of which matching rule is chosen. In the same
example however, using the Uniform rule in the first estate and a priority rule in the second
one does not lead to a violation of efficiency.
Example 4.1: Let p(R) = (0.4, 0.4, 0.55, 0.8) and let Ω = (1, 1). If the Uniform rule is
20If a multi-estate rule is not consistent in this sense, the way an estate is allocated can depend on the
preferences of agents in other estates. For example, consider a multi-estate rule which uses a constant
matching rule and a priority allocation rule where the priority ordering depends on agent 1’s preferences
(e.g. (1, ..., n) if 0R11 and (n, ..., 1) if 1P10). Now, as agent 1’s preferences change, the matching of the
agents to the estates will remain the same but the allocation in each estate will change.
25
used in both estates, the following allocations are attainable via critical partitions.
Partition x1 x2 x3 x4
[{1, 2, 3}, {4}] 0.33 0.33 0.33 1
[{1, 2}, {3, 4}] 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
[{1, 3}, {2, 4}] 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.5
[{2, 3}, {1, 4}] 0.5 0.45 0.55 0.5
Each is Pareto dominated by the allocation
x∗ = (0.45, 0.45, 0.55, 0.55)
if 0.45Ri0.33 for i = 1, 2 and 0.55R41 with at least one preference being strict.
On the other hand, if the Uniform rule is used in the first estate and the Serial Dictatorship
with priority order (4, 3, 2, 1) is used in the second, the allocations resulting from critical
partitions are as follows.
Partition x1 x2 x3 x4
[{1, 2, 3}, {4}] 0.33 0.33 0.33 1
[{1, 2}, {3, 4}] 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.8
[{1, 3}, {2, 4}] 0.45 0.2 0.55 0.8
[{2, 3}, {1, 4}] 0.2 0.45 0.55 0.8
[{4}, {1, 2, 3}] 0.05 0.4 0.55 1
[{3, 4}, {1, 2}] 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5
[{2, 4}, {1, 3}] 0.45 0.4 0.55 0.6
[{1, 4}, {2, 3}] 0.4 0.45 0.55 0.6
The allocations x1 = (0.45, 0.2, 0.55, 0.8) and x2 = (0.2, 0.45, 0.55, 0.8) can not both be
Pareto dominated, independent of how the agents’ preferences are. In both, agents 3 and 4
receive their peaks. Since in any Pareto dominating allocation they should continue to do so,
they should be in different estates and together with at least one other agent. Thus x1 can
only be Pareto dominated by x2 or vice versa. But then the Pareto dominating allocation is
efficient.
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5 Appendix
When there are two agents, an efficient and strategy proof single-estate rule can be described
fully in terms of a median voter rule (Moulin 1980, Barberà et. al. 1997). A median voter
rule is defined as follows. First, given that there are only two agents, preferences of agent
2 can be described in terms of agent 1’s share. Essentially this is a one-dimensional choice
problem where both agents have preference over the same object (which is agent 1’s share).
Then, median voter rules are of the following form; let 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ω, then:
f1(R1, R2, ω) =



p(R1) if p1 ≤ p(R1) ≤ p2,
median {p(R1), ω − p(R2), p1} if p(R1) < p1,
median{p(R1), ω − p(R2), p2} if p(R1) > p2.
(11)
Among such rules, nondictatorial ones can be characterized in Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: We prove this result for agent 1; the proof for agent 2 is exactly
the same. If p(R1) + p(R2) > ω, then by Equation (11), f1(RN , ω) = p(R1) if and only if
p(R1) ≤ p2. Hence md1(N,ω) = p2. Alternatively if p(R1) + p(R2) < ω, f1(RN , ω) = p(R1)
if and only if p(R1) ≥ p1. Therefore ms1(N,ω) = p1. Thus efficiency and strategy proofness
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are sufficient to imply the existence of such mdi and m
s
i . Now, since f is nondictatorial, p1,
p2 and hence msi , m
d
i are strictly between 0 and ω.
Proof of Lemma 3.4: The proof is by induction. For |N | = 2, the conclusion follows
from Lemma 3.3. Now, let n ≥ 3 and assume that the conclusion holds for all N ⊂ N with
|N | < n.
For contradiction, suppose there is N0 ⊂ N with |N0| = n, ω0 ∈ Z, i, j ∈ N0, R0
N0\{i,j} ∈
RN0\{i,j} with p(R0
N0\{i,j}) > 0, and for all ε ∈ (0, ω0), there is Rεi , Rεj ∈ R such that
p(Rεi ) < ε and p(R
ε
i ) + p(R
ε
j) +
P
N0\{i,j} p(R
0
l ) < ω
0, but fi(Rεi , R
ε
j , R
0
N0\{i,j}, ω
0) = p(Rεi ).
Let Rε
N0
= (Rεi , R
ε
j , R
0
N0\{i,j}).
For each k ∈ N0 \ {i, j}, by the induction hypothesis applied to N0 \ {k},
msi ({i, j}, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − p(R0k)) ∈ (0, ω0).
Claim. For all k ∈ N0 \ {i, j}, ε ∈ R+ with 0 < ε < msi ({i, j}, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − p(R0k)), and
Rεi , R
ε
j ∈ R as defined above, we have fk(RεN0, ω0) > p(R0k).
Proof of Claim. Since p(Rεi ) < m
s
i ({i, j}, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − p(R0k)) and p(Rεi ) + p(Rεj) +P
N0\{i,j} p(R
0
l ) < ω
0, by the induction hypothesis applied to N0 \ {k} we have
fi(R
ε
N0\{k}, ω
0 − p(R0k)) > p(Rεi ).
Now suppose fk(RεN0, ω
0) = p(R0k). Then by consistency,
fi(R
ε
N0, ω
0) = fi(R
ε
N0\{k}, ω
0 − p(R0k)) > p(Rεi ).
By definition of the profile Rε
N0
however, fi(RεN0, ω
0) = p(Rεi ), a contradiction. Thus, by
efficiency, fk(RεN0, ω
0) > p(R0k). QED
Now fix an agent k ∈ N0 \ {i, j} and consider a sequence {εt}∞t=0 −→ 0 such that for
all t ∈ N, 0 < εt < msi ({i, j}, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − p(R0k)). By our supposition, there exist two
sequences {Rεti }∞t=0 and {Rεtj }∞t=0 such that for all t ∈ N, p(Rεti )+p(Rεtj )+
P
N0\{i,j} p(R
0
l ) < ω
0
and fi(Rε
t
i , R
εt
j , R
0
N0\{i,j}, ω
0) = p(Rε
t
i ).
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By the previous claim and by our assumption that p(R0
N0\{i,j}) > 0, for all t ∈ N we have
fk(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
0
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) > p(R0k) > 0.
Now let R∗k ∈ R be such that p(R∗k) = 0. Then, by Lemma 3.2,
fk(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = fk(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
0
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0)
and thus, by consistency f(Rε
t
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = f(Rε
t
i , R
εt
j , R
0
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0).21
Now given a preference relation R ∈ R, let R ∈ R be the symmetric preference relation
with the same peak, that is, let p(R) = p(R) and for all α ∈ [0, p(R)], (p(R)−α) I (p(R)+α).
Then by Lemma 3.1,
fi(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = fi(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0)
and by consistency,
f(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = f(Rε
t
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0).
Similarly, by Lemma 3.1 and consistency,
f(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = f(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0).
Overall, for each t ∈ N
fi(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = p(R
εt
i )
and
fk(R
εt
i , R
εt
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) > p(R0k) > 0.
Let R∗i ∈ R be such that p(R∗i ) = 0. Since for all t ∈ N, p(Rε
t
i ) < ε
t and since limt→∞ εt =
0, we have limt→∞ p(R
εt
i ) = 0 and thus, limt→∞R
εt
i = R
∗
i . Now note that {p(Rε
t
j )}∞t=0 is a
21Though this is a typical application of consistency, let us clarify. Let z = fk(Rε
t
i , Rε
t
j , R∗k, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0).
Then by consistency, fN0\{k}(Rε
t
i , Rε
t
j , R∗k, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0) = fN0\{k}(Rε
t
i , Rε
t
j , R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − z). Also by
consistency, fN0\{k}(Rε
t
i , Rε
t
j , R0k, R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0) = fN0\{k}(Rε
t
i , Rε
t
j , R0N0\{i,j,k}, ω0 − z). This establishes
the desired equality.
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sequence in the compact set Z. It therefore has a convergent subsequence {p(Rεs(t)j )}∞t=0.
Let R∗j ∈ R be the symmetric preference relation such that p(R∗j ) = limt→∞ p(Rε
s(t)
j ). Then
limt→∞R
εs(t)
j = R
∗
j . Thus
lim
t→∞
(R
εs(t)
i , R
εs(t)
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = (R∗i , R
∗
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0).
Therefore, by continuity
fi(R
∗
i , R
∗
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) = p(R∗i ) = 0
and
fk(R
∗
i , R
∗
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0) ≥ p(R0k) > 0.
Let ω∗ = fk(R∗i , R
∗
j , R
∗
k, R
0
N0\{i,j,k}, ω
0). Thus by consistency,
f(R∗i , R
∗
k, ω
∗) = (0, ω∗).
Note that p(R∗i ) = p(R
∗
k) = 0 < ω
∗. This, however, contradicts Lemma 3.3.
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